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Abstract
In this paper we estimate the increase in the market share of ENERGY STAR-qualiﬁed appliances that
can be attributed to targetted cash rebates offered by utility companies. To estimate the impact of these
incentives we use the variation in timing and size of the utility rebates across the US states. We then use
these estimates along with information on the average energy saved by using an ENERGY STAR appliance
relative to a non-ENERGY STAR appliance to provide an estimate on the cost per tonne of carbon saved by
therebateprogram. Ourresultsshowthatadollarincreaseintherebateleadstoa0.3%increaseintheshare
of ENERGY STAR-qualiﬁed clothes washers while the effect of rebates is not signiﬁcant for dishwashers
and refrigerators. Assuming a redemption rate of 40%, we calculate the cost of saving a tonne of carbon
through the clothes washer rebate program to be around $158. The corresponding cost of a megawatt hour
saved (about $32), is lower than the estimated cost of building and operating an additional power plant
and the average on-peak spot price. We conclude that the ENERGY STAR clothes washers rebate programs
are a cost-effective way for utilities to reduce energy demand.
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change. The energy sector accounts for approximately 65% of our output of GHGs (International Energy
Agency, 2009) and thus reducing emissions in this sector is a crucial element of GHG reduction. To reduce
GHGs increasing energy efﬁciency is considered a “low-hanging fruit” because of its low marginal cost.
The World Energy Outlook 2009, published by the International Energy Agency (IEA), highlights the huge
potential of CO2 reductions from increased energy efﬁciency. The quote by Carl Pope further highlights the
importance of energy efﬁciency. In this paper we analyse a policy in the US that uses ﬁnancial incentives to
encourage the adoption of energy efﬁcient household appliances.
Federal and local governments and utility companies across the US and Canada promote the adoption
of energy efﬁcient appliances identiﬁed by a voluntary eco-labelling program, the ENERGY STAR label, by
offering ﬁnancial incentives. These incentives are usually in the form of rebates. Some US states have also
introduced sales tax holidays on energy efﬁcient appliances.2 However, in the majority of the cases these
sales tax holidays are offered only over an extremely short period of time, e.g. a weekend. The ENERGY
STAR label is designed to promote the use of energy-efﬁcient products and thus help to reduce the emis-
sions of greenhouse gases by reducing energy consumption. The adoption of energy efﬁcient appliances
has public (reduced GHG emissions) and private (savings in utility bills) beneﬁts.3 In this paper we ask two
questions. First, what is the sales impact of these rebates? Second, is it cost effective for a utility company
to offer rebates to its consumers to buy ENERGY STAR labelled appliances?
To study the impact of rebates on the sales of energy efﬁcient ENERGY STAR appliances we use quar-
terly sales data on the percentage of ENERGY STAR labelled appliances (clothes washers, dishwashers, and
refrigerators) for all 50 US states. We combine this with a detailed utility-level and state-level dataset on
rebate programs between 2001 and 2006. Our aim is to identify the impact of rebates on sales of ENERGY
1Wald (2007)
2Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Missouri,North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia and West Virginia
have introduced sales tax holidays.
3According to calculations made by D&R International Ltd. the lifetime cost for clothes washers, using the product database from
2007, was $1,883 for a standard model and $1,726 for an ENERGY STAR model. While the median purchase price for a standard model
($573) was much lower than an ENERGY STAR model ($966) the average energy costs for the former were much higher at $1,310 than
the latter ($760).
2STAR appliances by correlating differences in the market share of ENERGY STAR appliance sales with
variation in rebate values across and within appliances and across and within US states over time. The
panel nature of our dataset allows us to ensure that we do not attribute state level differences, or national
level common time effects to the rebate variable. Our results indicate that, on average, a weighted utility
rebate of $15 increased the market share of ENERGY STAR-qualiﬁed clothes washers by 4.5%. We also ﬁnd
that the utility rebates had no signiﬁcant impact on the sales of ENERGY STAR-qualiﬁed dishwashers and
refrigerators.
We then use the above estimates to evaluate the cost of a tonne of carbon emissions saved as well as the
cost of a megawatt hour saved. The former cost calculation will enable us to compare the cost with that of
the social opportunity cost of carbon while the latter cost will be informative in comparing with the cost of
constructing and operating a power plant or the average price of additional electricity bought in the spot
market. Both costs depend on the assumption for redemption rates of mail-in rebates, which are the main
avenue for these rebates. The cost ranges from $158 to $395 depending on a redemption rate of 40% and
100% respectively. We also calculate the cost of a megawatt hour saved due to having the rebate programs
in place for comparisons with the estimated cost of building and operating a power plant as well as the cost
of on-peak spot prices. This cost of a megawatt hour saved ranges from around $32 to $80 depending on the
redemption rate being 40% and %100 respectively. The lower estimate of $32 per megawatt hour saved is
much lower than the cost of constructing and operating the cheapest power plant.4 Average on-peak prices
at $60 are also higher than the cost of rebate programs which means that buying electricity in case demand
exceeds supply is more expensive than reducing electricity demand through increased efﬁciency.
There has been, to the best of our knowledge, no research on evaluating the impact of utility rebates
to promote the sale of ENERGY STAR appliances. The utility rebate programs we study in this paper are
a part of demand-side management (DSM) initiatives undertaken by utility companies. DSM refers to the
“planning, implementation, andmonitoringofutilityactivitiesdesignedtoencourageconsumerstomodify
patterns of electricity usage, including the timing and level of electricity demand” (Energy Information
Administration, 2009). They were initiated in the late 1970s primarily due to rising gas and oil prices.5 The
Energy Information Administration (2009) reports that the total actual peak load reduction achieved in 2007
through DSM was 30,276 MW with 58% being attributed to energy efﬁciency while the total DSM cost was
$2.5 billion. Gillingham et al. (2006) provide a review of, among other things, DSM activities and report the
4The cost of a coal-ﬁred power plant, according to Du and Parsons (2009), is the lowest at $62 per megawatt hour.
5See Eto (1996), Nadel and Geller (1996) and Nadel (2000) for a history of utility DSM programs in the US.
3range of negawatt6 costs calculated in the existing literature to be between $8 and $229 per megawatt hour
saved. A recent paper by Arimura et al. (2009) ﬁnds that DSM expenditures over the last couple of decades
have cost utilities around $60 per MWh saved.
Our focus in this paper is on a speciﬁc component of DSM, namely, the utility rebate programs pro-
moting the purchase of energy efﬁcient household appliances. Very few studies have looked at the cost-
effectiveness of rebate programs in the residential sector. Revelt and Train (1998) estimate the impact of
rebates and loans on the choice of efﬁciency of refrigerators by residential customers of Southern California
Edison (SCE) using stated preference data. They predict that the rebate program has led 8.5% customers to
switch from a standard-efﬁciency refrigerator to a high-efﬁciency one. They also ﬁnd that loan programs
have a greater impact with 22.6% of buyers switching from standard to high efﬁciency.7 In a survey of
the literature on the various kinds of DSM programs Nadel (1992) shows that the cost per kilowatt hour
incurred by a utility in rebate programs ranges from low to moderate8 and is generally between $14 to $50
per megawatt hour.9 Nadel (1990) reports the cost to utilities for rebate programs in the commercial and
industrial sectors to be $20-30 per megawatt hour.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief overview of the
ENERGY STAR program. We then discuss the rebate programs offered by utility companies in section
3 and follow it up with a description of the data, its sources and limitations in section 4. The empirical
strategy is laid out in section 5 and the econometric results are discussed in section 6. The penultimate
section uses the results from our regression model to calculate the energy saving and cost of the rebate
programs while the ﬁnal section has concluding remarks.
2 A Brief Overview of ENERGY STAR
TheENERGYSTARprogramwasintroducedin1992bytheUnitedStatesEnvironmentalProtectionAgency
(EPA) as a voluntary labelling program designed to promote the use of energy-efﬁcient products and thus
help to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases. Research on the ENERGY STAR program has focused
almost exclusively on the energy, dollar and carbon savings or the overall success of the ENERGY STAR
program. Howarth et al. (2000) ﬁnd that the Green Lights and ENERGY STAR Ofﬁce Products programs
6“Negawatt” is a term coined by Amory Lovins of the Rocky Mountain Institute to refer to a watt of electricity that does not have
to be produced due to an energy saving process in place.
7See Train and Atherton (1995) for a similar paper.
8This is based on rebate programs for commercial and industrial as well as residential sectors.
9We hereon, convert all ﬁgures originally reported in kilowatt hours to megawatt hours for consistency. 1 megawatt hour (MWh)
= 1,000 kilowatt hours (kWh).
4Figure1: SHARE OF ENERGY STAR QUALIFIED DISHWASHERS, CLOTHES WASHERS AND REFRIGERATORS
(SOURCE: ENERGY STAR)
have very little effect on the demand for energy but improvements in energy efﬁciency lead to one-to-one
reductions in energy use. In terms of calculating savings estimates, Webber et al. (2000) conclude that 740
petajoules of energy has been saved10 and 13 million metric tons of carbon avoided due to the ENERGY
STAR program. In a more recent study, Sanchez et al. (2008) estimate that ENERGY STAR-labelled products
have saved 4.8EJ of primary energy and avoided 82Tg C equivalent.11.
In this paper, we focus on the ENERGY STAR program for clothes washers, dishwashers and refriger-
ators. The market share of ENERGY STAR qualiﬁed clothes washers has increased from 10% in 2001 to
almost 38% in 2006. ENERGY STAR qualiﬁed dishwashers have captured a little more than 92% of the mar-
ket in 2006 as compared to around 10% in 2001 (Figure 1). Figure 1 shows the high penetration of ENERGY
STAR qualiﬁed dishwashers when compared to clothes washers and refrigerators.
3 Utility Rebates
In 1998, ENERGY STAR qualiﬁed clothes washers in the northwestern part of the United States were pro-
moted through rebates and incentives offered by the Northwest Energy Efﬁciency Alliance. Supplemental
101 petajoule = 1015 Joules. 740 petajoules is equivalent to 205:5  106 MWh. 1 MWh = 3:6  109 Joules.
111EJ (Exajoule)=1018 Joules. 4.8EJ is equivalent to 1:3  109 MWh. 1Tg (Teragram) = 1012 grams
5rebates and ﬁnancing was offered by a number of utilities in Washington, Oregon, Montana and Idaho
(ENERGY STAR Sales Report, 1999). Similarly, most utility companies in California and several utility com-
panies in New England (through the Northeast Energy Efﬁciency Partnerships, Inc.) and Wisconsin also
supported the sale of ENERGY STAR appliances (ENERGY STAR Sales Report, 1999). The same regions
experienced a much larger penetration of ENERGY STAR qualiﬁed clothes washers than other regions.
While the savings to consumers, in terms of lower utility bills, are quite obvious there are a number
of reasons why utilities would want to promote the use of ENERGY STAR products.12 The literature on
DSM argues that promoting energy efﬁciency costs less than building new power plants. There are also
environmental reasons. Utility companies need to follow a number of environmental regulations. There are
emissions control strategies in place and saving energy on the margin will allow the more polluting plants
to be removed from producing electricity. Reducing electricity demand also reduces the need to upgrade
the transmission and distribution network. Lastly, reducing peak demand combined with reducing energy
demand can lead to grid reliability.
4 Data Description
We use data from a number of sources. The sales data of ENERGY STAR-qualiﬁed appliances are from the
US Department of Energy (2008a). Information about the utility rebates on ENERGY STAR products is from
D&R International Ltd. Demographic data come from the Current Population Survey, the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis and the US Census. Electricity price data are from the Energy Information Administration
of the US Department of Energy.
4.1 ENERGY STAR Sales
The ENERGY STAR website13 has data on sales of the four major appliances, viz. clothes washers, dish-
washers, air conditioners and refrigerators. The data are disaggregated by the type of major appliance in
each US state by quarter from 2001 to 2006. We exclude air conditioners from our analysis due to missing
data. Sales of appliances are categorized into ENERGY STAR and non-ENERGY STAR units. The appliance
manufacturers report the sale of ENERGY STAR units to the US EPA every year. For obtaining sales ﬁgures
12Beneﬁts to consumers can be seen by comparing the average energy use of an ENERGY STAR and a non-ENERGY STAR qualiﬁed
appliance. See Table 6 for information on the energy used by an average ENERGY STAR versus an average non-ENERGY STAR
clothes washer and Table 8 for dishwashers and refrigerators.
13http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=manuf res.pt appliances
6of non-ENERGY STAR units the EPA uses the difference of the sales ﬁgures of total ENERGY STAR units
sold and the total US sales obtained from industry reports.
4.2 Utility Rebates
Financial incentives are in the form of rebates that vary in amount as well as form across utility companies
and across different appliances. Information about rebates and incentives provided by utilities between
2001 and 2006 was obtained from D&R International Ltd. This includes details of the incentive type, the
program name, the amount of rebate offered, a summary of the rebate with the period of time the rebate is
offered and the appliances or products to which the rebate applies. Table 1 provides details on the number
of utility companies providing rebates to its customers from 2001 to 2006 for various appliances. Rebates
are concentrated mostly in the northwestern states and California as well as northeastern states. We have
considered only mail-in and instant rebates that constitute 91% of the total incentives on offer. Our dataset
has a total of 602 ﬁnancial incentives out of which 546 are mail-in and instant rebates. Of those, 95% are
mail-in and 5% are instant rebates.Table 2 provides a detailed breakdown of the various types of ﬁnancial
incentives offered by utility companies. Figure 2 shows the rebate amounts and corresponding frequencies
in our sample. Most of the rebate amounts have a $50 or $100 value for clothes washers. Rebates for
dishwashers and refrigerators in our sample are typically $25 or $50.
The disadvantage of not having sales ﬁgures by smaller geographic entities is that rebates provided
by utility companies are local in nature and, usually, do not apply to the entire state. That leads to an
aggregation problem when we are trying to estimate the effectiveness of rebates on the sales of ENERGY
STAR units for the state as a whole. Consider a situation where we have rebates in two states with a
similar population, and preferences. The rebates are assumed, for the sake of simplicity, to be of equal
value. However, the extent of the rebates differ with one state having it in, say, just one county served by
a utility company and the other state having it in many more counties. This should not lead to the same
effect on the state-wide sales share of ENERGY STAR appliances. In this situation we would expect the
latter of the two states to have a bigger impact on the sales share. To rectify this we assign weights to the
rebates. The weights that we use are the share of the residential customers served by the utility company
providingtherebatetothetotalnumberofresidentialcustomersinastate. Thenumberofcustomersserved
by each utility company are from the Energy Information Administration (2006) of the US Department of
Energy. Using weighted rebates means that utilities serving a larger customer base will have higher weights
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State Clothes Washers Dishwashers Refrigerators
California 28 23 36
Colorado 8 1 2
Connecticut 6 0 3
Iowa 12 11 13
Idaho 12 8 5
Illinois 2 0 0
Massachusetts 21 2 0
Minnesota 19 6 7
Missouri 1 0 0
Montana 7 6 6
New Hampshire 8 0 0
Nevada 10 3 8
New York 2 0 0
Oregon 51 35 30
Rhode Island 3 0 0
South Dakota 2 0 0
Texas 0 0 1
Utah 0 0 1
Washington 60 26 21
Wisconsin 2 2 3
Wyoming 1 1 1
Total 255 124 137
Note: Numbers indicate total number of utility rebates offered.
Table 2: TYPES OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVES OFFERED BY UTILITY COMPANIES (2001–2006)
Type of Dollar Incentive/Rebate Frequency Percent
Instant Rebate (at point of sale) 14 2.56
Instant Rebate (as credit on bill) 15 2.74
Mail-in Rebate 517 94.69
assigned to their rebates. 14
4.3 Demographic and Electricity Data
We use state quarterly personal income estimates from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis to measure
income.15 The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a monthly household survey conducted by the Bureau
14Our preferred speciﬁcations use weighted rebates. However in the text we also report results from using a simple average of
utility rebate offered. We have also analysed the impact of utility rebates after controlling for state level sales tax rebates on ENERGY
STAR appliances. Unlike the utility rebates, which last typically for an year or more, most state level rebates typically lasted for a
few days during a year. These results are not reported in the text and can be requested from the authors. We ﬁnd that the results of
regressions controlling for the sales tax rebate are essentially the same as those reported in this paper. Coefﬁcients on the sales tax
rebates are not signiﬁcant. This is because these rebates were in place only for a few days and since we are using quarterly sales data
it is hard to identify their impact.
15Personal income is the income received by all persons from all sources.
8Figure 2: HISTOGRAM OF ENERGY STAR REBATE AMOUNTS (2001–2006)
of Labor Statistics to measure participation and employment of the US labour force. The CPS has details on
the highest level of education obtained. We construct a measure of education, ‘Having a degree’, that gives
us the fraction of people in a particular US state to have completed a degree of any kind. 16
Electricity prices are from the (Energy Information Administration, 2008) of the US Department of En-
ergy. We calculate the quarterly price for each state from 2001 to 2006 using the monthly retail price for
electricity in the residential sector.
5 Empirical Strategy
The timing and size of rebates varies across states and time. We use these variations to estimate the impact
of the utility rebates on the sales of ENERGY STAR labelled clothes washers, dishwashers and refrigerators.
In addition there are several states that did not provide any such incentives to its customers. Our depen-
16Associate Degree-Occupational/Vocational, Associate Deg.-Academic Program, Bachelor’s Degree(ex: BA, AB, BS), Master’s(ex:
MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW), Professional School Deg(ex: MD, DDS, DVM) or Doctorate Degree(ex: PhD, EdD).
9Table 3: SUMMARY STATISTICS (2001–2006)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Clothes Washers Share 0.274 0.138 0.026 0.842 1200
Log of Clothes Washers Share -1.460 0.626 -3.663 -0.173 1200
Dishwashers Share 0.607 0.286 0.056 1.000 1200
Log of Dishwashers Share -0.663 0.641 -2.875 0.000 1200
Refrigerators Share 0.273 0.108 0 0.595 1200
Log of Refrigerators Share -1.473 0.838 -6.847 -0.520 1199
Log Average Personal Income 11.628 1.055 9.595 14.203 1200
Share of people with degrees 0.317 0.049 0.174 0.468 1200
Log Electricity Price in current quarter -0.261 0.262 -0.761 0.762 1200
dent variable is the logarithm of the market share of ENERGY STAR appliances. Formally, our empirical
speciﬁcation is:







2cAppliance dummycit*Util. Reb.cit + 3Xcit + "cit; (1)
where c is the index for the appliance type (i.e. clothes washer, dishwasher or refrigerator), i is the US state
index and t is the year-quarter time index. The 2c coefﬁcients on the right-hand side are our variables of
interest since they indicate the effect of the rebate offered on a particular appliance on the market share of
that particular appliance. Xcit is a vector of controls and "cit is the standard i.i.d. error term.
This speciﬁcation enables us to estimate the impact of incentives provided by utility companies as well
as control for various other factors that may affect the share of ENERGY STAR appliances.17 A positive
estimate for all three 2c coefﬁcients would imply that the rebates are having a favourable impact and
that the utility companies are being successful in encouraging people to switch to more energy-efﬁcient
technologies. In our set of controls, among other time and state dummies, we also include the fraction of
the population having at least a degree, the average personal income (in logarithmic form) for each US
State, and the price of electricity. Summary statistics are presented in Table 3.
Recall that data on rebates are at the utility level. For our aggregation to the state level we present results
of two indicators. We ﬁrst use the average rebate amount in a state. We construct this by calculating the
simple average of all the rebates given by utility companies in a state in a particular quarter for a particular
17Note that even though the individuals coefﬁcients on the impact of the rebate can differ, our regression pools all three appliances
together. This is because we believe that the same underlying utility function determines the choice between an ENERGY STAR and
a non-ENERGY STAR appliance.
10Table 4: REBATE STATISTICS FOR US STATES PROVIDING REBATES (2001–2006)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Clothes Washers
Avg. Rebate Amount 69.699 27.547 25 200 239
Avg. Weighted Rebate Amount 15.215 21.722 0.057 100 239
Dishwashers
Avg. Rebate Amount 34.746 13.505 10 62.5 158
Avg. Weighted Rebate Amount 1.588 4.365 0.019 35 158
Refrigerators
Avg. Rebate Amount 50.640 26.324 15 117.5 177
Avg. Weighted Rebate Amount 6.826 15.524 0.022 100 177
appliance. Our second, and preferred, measure of the utility rebate variable attaches weights to the rebate
values. These weights are calculated by dividing the number of residential customers served by the utility
company providing the rebate with the total number of residential customers in a state. We do this to
ensure that areas with a higher residential customer base in a state have larger weights attached to the
utility rebates.
We provide summary statistics of the different rebate measures in Table 4. The last column in the table,
Obs., indicates the number of data points in our dataset that the rebates imply. For example, there are 239
state-quarter rebates for clothes washers. Since our panel has 50 US states that we track over four quarters
for a period of six years between 2001 and 2006 there are 1200 observations for clothes washers alone. For
clothes washers, out of those 1200 observations, 239 data points have rebates. The table shows us that the
number of utility rebates available for clothes washers far exceeds that for dishwashers and refrigerators.
If we consider the average rebate amount and the average weighted rebate amount we see that clothes
washers get a much higher rebate amount when compared to dishwashers and refrigerators. The number
of rebates as well as the average amount of a rebate is lowest for dishwashers.
We use both ﬁxed and random effects panel data regression models. In the speciﬁcations we ﬁrst ob-
serve the effects of the utility rebates on the market share of ENERGY STAR appliances without controlling
for any other factors. We then introduce demographic variables, namely the average personal income (in
logarithmic form), the fraction of people having degrees and also electricity prices. In the third speciﬁca-
tion we interact the appliance dummies with quarter dummies to control for any seasonality that may exist.
Lastly, we introduce year-quarter time dummies interacted with the appliance dummies that will capture
all changes over time. Since we have state ﬁxed effects in our ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation introducing year-
quarter dummies will take into account most of the variation that may occur. This is, therefore, the most
11comprehensive and our preferred speciﬁcation.
6 Results
We now present the results of the speciﬁcations and describe the methods used to estimate the coefﬁcients.
The dependent variable in all the speciﬁcations is the log of share of ENERGY STAR appliances.
It is often customary while reporting panel regression results to report the results from the pooled OLS
speciﬁcation. In the interest of preserving space we have left out the pooled OLS results. This is because
the F-test of the null hypothesis that the constant terms are equal across all the states is rejected. In other
words, there are signiﬁcant state level effects which implies that pooled OLS would be inappropriate. In
the main text of this paper we only present results from a ﬁxed effects panel data speciﬁcation with our
preferred weighted average rebate variable (see Table 5). The ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation with the simple
average rebate variable is in Table 9 of Appendix A. The alternative random effects estimation (presented
in Tables 10 and 11 in Appendix A.1) assumes exogeneity of all the regressors with the random individual
effects.18 This is a strong assumption that may not be realistic in our case. We use a test for overidentifying
restrictions to test for ﬁxed versus random effects and ﬁnd that the hypothesis of the regressors being
orthogonal to the state-level ﬁxed effect is rejected.19 For this reason the ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation is our
preferred speciﬁcation.
The columns FE1, FE2, FE3 and FE4 in Table 5 estimate eq.(1) using a ﬁxed effects panel data model. In
column FE1 we do not have any controls for demographics or the effect of time. In FE2 we introduce demo-
graphics, FE3 has dummmy variables for quarters while FE4 is the most comprehensive speciﬁcation with
dummies for each of our time periods. Since we are using market shares of all three household appliances,
viz. clothes washers, dishwashers and refrigerators, we have appliance dummies to control for the type of
appliance. As mentioned before, the coefﬁcients of interest are the ones for the appliance type interacted
with the average rebate amount. The baseline is the case where there are no rebates. A positive coefﬁcient
for the interaction of appliance type with average rebate amount would indicate a favourable effect on the
ENERGY STAR sales share of the appliance due to the rebate.
The results in Table 5 show that while utility rebates for clothes washers show a positive and signiﬁcant
effect the effect is not the same for dishwashers and refrigerators. The effect, while positive and signiﬁcant
18Random effect models are better suited to estimating models that have time-invariant independent variables. They are also more
efﬁcient than ﬁxed effects models.
19We use the xtoverid command (Schaffer and Stillman, 2006) in STATA.
12for dishwashers in FE1, FE2 and FE3 loses its signiﬁcance in FE4. The impact of rebates is not signiﬁcant for
refrigerators. TheFE4speciﬁcationindicatesthattheeffectisnotasrobustfordishwashersandrefrigerators
as it is for clothes washers.
We choose the FE4 speciﬁcation over FE2 and FE3 because it is the most comprehensive speciﬁcation.
Results from our preferred speciﬁcation, FE4 from Table 5, show that a $1 increase in utility rebates will
lead to a 0.3% increase in the share of ENERGY STAR clothes washers but the effect is not signiﬁcant for
dishwashers and refrigerators.
We should note, however, that the average weighted clothes washer rebate is around $15. Therefore, a
$15 increase leads to a 4.5% in the share of sales of ENERGY STAR clothes washers. We can conclude that
the rebate programs have had a positive and signiﬁcant effect on clothes washers but they have not made
much impact on the other appliances.
If we consider other controls in explaining the sales of ENERGY STAR appliances we see that there is a
positive effect of average personal income. We expect wealthier people to buy ENERGY STAR appliances
since they are, on average, about $350 more expensive than non-ENERGY STAR models. Our result is
similar to that in the literature of tax incentives on the sales of hybrid cars, e.g. in Gallagher and Muehlegger
(2008), which have shown that the effect of income is positive. The effect of earnings in our regressions
results is positive and signiﬁcant. We also look at the effect of education on the purchase of energy-efﬁcient
appliances. We ﬁnd that the higher is the fraction of people having a degree in a state the more likely they
are to purchase an ENERGY STAR clothes washer. This could be due a greater awareness of ENERGY
STAR products and appliances, or a greater concern for the environment. Note that these two effects,
become insigniﬁcant when we include time dummies. We expect the coefﬁcient for the price of electricity
to be positive implying that a higher cost of running appliances would cause people to switch to more
energy-efﬁcient ones. This is borne out in our speciﬁcation. However, on including quarter dummies, this
coefﬁcient becomes insigniﬁcant.
The coefﬁcients for dishwasher rebates and refrigerator rebates are negative but insigniﬁcant and posi-
tive but signiﬁcant respectively. However, the signiﬁcance for refrigerator rebates is signiﬁcant at only 10%.
Also, the sign is not consistent over all our speciﬁcations which is the reason why we have not consid-
ered refrigerators in the implications for policy. There are a couple of reasons why we believe that rebates
for dishwashers are not effective. The efﬁciency standard for dishwashers has not been changed very fre-
quently to allow for changes in efﬁciency of the dishwashers in the market. As a result, a huge percentage
of dishwashers in the market were ENERGY STAR-rated and therefore, rebates may not have had an im-
13Table 5: REGRESSION MODELS WITH AVERAGE WEIGHTED UTILITY REBATES (2001 – 2006)
Fixed Effects
Variable FE1 FE2 FE3 FE4
CW*Rebate 1.250 .549 .576 .320
(.201) (.184) (.180) (.122)
DW*Rebate 2.132 .892 .917 -.508
(.587) (.240) (.204) (.421)
RF*Rebate 1.311 -.0002 -.058 .238
(.450) (.280) (.238) (.130)
DW dummy .823 .808
(.054) (.055)
RF dummy .004 .0001
(.035) (.035)
Log Personal Income 3.926 4.115 .144
(.732) (.837) (.231)
Share of People with Degrees 4.427 4.078 .111
(1.220) (1.267) (.217)
Log Electricity Price .434 -.035 -.186
(.479) (.619) (.078)
Quarter dummies*Appliance dummies Yes
Year-Quarter dummies*Appliance dummies Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 3599 3599 3599 3599
Groups 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 .263 .541 .569 .920
Signiﬁcance level at 1% denoted by .
Dependent variable is Log (Share of sales of ENERGY STAR Appliances).
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level.
Utility rebate amounts re-scaled, CW: Clothes Washers, RF: Refrigerators, DW: Dishwashers
14pact. Secondly, the frequency and average amount of rebates for both dishwashers and refrigerators were
lower than rebates for clothes washers. The rebates may not have persuaded the marginal consumer to
make the switch from a non-ENERGY STAR-rated machine to an ENERGY STAR-rated one. However,
these are merely hypotheses and it may prove to be a future area of research to isolate the causes, if any, of
a difference in the effects of rebates for different appliances.
7 Policy Implications
We use estimates from our preferred speciﬁcation, FE4 from Table 5, to examine the effect of utility rebates.
Since the coefﬁcient for clothes washers rebates is robust over speciﬁcations FE2 to FE3 we only consider
clothes washers and exclude dishwashers and refrigerators for calculating the cost of the rebate programs.
We ﬁrst perform a counterfactual exercise in which we assume that none of the states have a utility rebate
in place, i.e. 2c = 0 in Eq.1. This gives us the market share of ENERGY STAR clothes washers if no utility
rebate had been offered, say ~ y. Since the estimated coefﬁcient of the effect of the utility rebate variable is
positive, the market share for ENERGY STAR clothes washers will be lower than the ﬁtted values using the
original estimating equation, say ^ y. We use the ratio of these ﬁtted values,
~ y
^ y
and multiply it with the actual
market share to obtain the counterfactual market share if there had been no rebate. The difference between
the counterfactual and the actual market shares is the effect of the utility rebates.
Note that we have used the share of ENERGY STAR appliances in our regressions. But to carry out the
counterfactual exercise we need unit sales. We have yearly but not quarterly unit sales ﬁgures of clothes
washers in every US state from 2001 to 2006. However, we do have the quarterly unit sales ﬁgures for the
overall US. Therefore, to get an approximate value of the quarterly unit sales in each US state we use the
overall US quarterly unit sales ﬁgures to get an approximate value of the quarterly unit sales. This will
account for the seasonality in sales that may exist. So, e.g., the yearly unit sales in California in 2001 were
766,500. The ﬁrst quarter unit sales overall in the US were approximately 26% of the annual unit sales in
2001. We assume the ﬁrst quarter unit sales in California (in 2001) to be 26% of 766,500.
We use these imputed values to obtain the increase in the units of ENERGY STAR clothes washers sold
in each state, i, in time t given by




15where IUSit is the increase in units sold of ENERGY STAR clothes washers, AUSit is the actual imputed
units sold, AMSit is the actual market share and CUSit is the counterfactual imputed units sold.
The total carbon saving, TCSit, is
TCSit = IUSit  Energy Use  Average Life  Carbon Emissions Factor (3)
where Energy Use is the difference in the energy use between an average ENERGY STAR and an average
non-ENERGY STAR clothes washer. The ‘Average Life’ is the average lifetime of a clothes washers which
is typically 11 years (US Department of Energy, 2008b). Annual estimates of the average energy used by
ENERGY STAR and non-ENERGY STAR clothes washers have been obtained from D&R International, Ltd.
and are listed in Table 6. The ﬁgures indicate the average energy consumed in a year under normal usage.
To transform the energy saved into the amount of carbon equivalent saved we use the carbon emissions
factor obtained by Sanchez et al. (2008) from the Cadmus Group. The carbon emissions factor is assumed
to be 0.203 kg C/kWh.20 Therefore, total energy saving is in terms of kg carbon equivalent forgone. We ﬁnd
that the energy saved leads to an equivalent carbon saving of around 78 thousand tons.
The total rebate outlay, Total Rebateit, in state i in time t is given by
Total Rebateit = Utility Rebateit  AUSit (4)
where Utility Rebateit is the average weighted rebate amount. This assumes that redemption rate for re-
bates is 100%. However, according to Spencer (2002), the redemption rate of mail-in rebates for typically
high-value products having a high rebate value is around 40%.21 After accounting for instant rebates we
calculate the cost of carbon emissions forgone using both redemption rates to get a range of the cost. A
100% redemption rate on mail-in rebates leads to a rebate spending of $36.34 million while assuming a 40%
redemption rate reduces that ﬁgure to $14.54 million.









20This means that to produce 1 kWh of electricity, on average, 203 kg of carbon equivalent is produced.
21According to personal interviews conducted by Silk and Janiszewski (2008), promotion managers said that “redemption rates
tend to be “very low” when the reward is below $10, that rebates of $10 to $20 on a $100 software product range between 10% and
30%, and that redemption rates on consumer electronics average approximately 40%”.
16Table 6: AVERAGE ENERGY USE OF CLOTHES WASHERS (IN KWH/YEAR)







Source: D&R International Ltd.
Using the ﬁgures for the rebate outlay this translates to a cost of $426 for every ton of carbon emissions
forgone when the redemption rate is 100% while the cost falls to $171 with the lower redemption rate
of 40%. If we compare the cost of reducing a ton of carbon to the social cost of carbon as estimated by
Nordhaus (2007), which is $17 per ton, we ﬁnd that utility companies end up paying much higher for
greenhouse gas reductions. However, our lower estimate of $171 per ton compares favourably with the
larger estimate of the social cost of carbon ($350 per ton) obtained by Stern (2007).
There may be concerns of a “rebound effect”. This could happen when the purchase of a high-efﬁciency
clothes washers results in higher usage and, therefore, eliminates the energy saving made by switching
from a standard efﬁciency machine. However, Davis (2008) uses household-level data from a ﬁeld trial to
show that the gains from the energy saving are not offset by higher usage. The ﬁeld trial in Bern, Kansas
(population approximately 200) was conducted to estimate the energy and water savings of h-axis clothes
washers by replacing the more inefﬁcient v-axis washers of the participating households (Tomlinson and
Rizy, 1998). Davis (2008) estimates a demand function for clothes washing and ﬁnds the price elasticity of
utilization to be very low at -0.06. We can, therefore, assume that the “rebound effect” is not signiﬁcant in
terms of estimating the energy saving.
As mentioned before, one of the reasons why utilities have Demand Side Management programs, like
rebates, in place is to reduce peak demand. For utility companies in a state with very little electricity supply,
like California, the cost of buying peak power when demand exceeds supply is very high. The other option
is to start peaking plants that are usually natural gas and are very expensive to start up and run. Assuming
a redemption rate of 40% the cost, per megawatt hour, of the utility rebate programs comes to around $32
while it is $80 for a 100% redemption rate. These are obtained by multiplying the cost per ton ($158) with
the carbon emissions factor (0.203 kg C/kWh). The lower estimate cost compares very favourably to the
17Table 7: COSTS OF ELECTRIC GENERATION ALTERNATIVES ($/MWH)
Type Base Case with Carbon Charge
$25/tCO2





Source: Du and Parsons (2009), original values are in cents/kWh.
average on-peak spot prices for electricity. Table 12 shows the ﬁgures for on-peak as well as off-peak spot
prices at different pricing points. The mean of average on-peak prices from 2003 to 2006 is $60 which is
considerably higher than the cost of the rebate programs. The mean of the minimum average on-peak
spot prices over the four years, $48, is also higher than the cost of the rebate programs. We can, therefore,
conclude that the rebate program for clothes washers has been successful for utility providers that are
looking to reduce the demand for electricity by providing incentives to consumers for switching to more
energy-efﬁcient models.
Since utilities are also concerned about the costs involved to build and operate additional power plants
we can compare the costs of the rebate programs to that of building one. Du and Parsons (2009) have cal-
culated the cost of electric generation for the three major types of power plants, viz. coal-ﬁred, gas-ﬁred
and nuclear. Their calculations, in Table 7 are an updated version of the ﬁgures published in Deutch et al.
(2003). Du and Parsons (2009) ﬁnd that the cost of constructing and operating a nuclear power plant is
highest, at $84 per megawatt hour. Coal and gas-ﬁred power plants are more cost-effective at $62 and $65
per megawatt hour. However, if the social cost of carbon is considered to be $25 per ton of CO2 emitted
then the costs rise substantially to $83 and $74 for coal- and gas-ﬁred plants respectively. Having utility re-
bate programs in place are, therefore, a cost-effective alternative to building and running additional power
plants.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have looked at the effectiveness of rebates provided by utility companies on the sales
of ENERGY STAR appliances by utilizing the variation in timing and size of the utility rebates across US
states. The results indicate that these programs have had a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the market
share of high efﬁciency clothes washers but not on refrigerators and dishwashers. We ﬁnd that an increase
18in a dollar value of rebate leads to a 0.3% increase in the share of ENERGY STAR-qualiﬁed clothes washers.
Since the average (weighted) rebate for a clothes washer is around $15 this translates to a 4.5% increase in
the share of energy-efﬁcient clothes washers. In terms of the impact of these rebates in terms of the cost
of carbon emissions forgone we ﬁnd that utility rebates lead to a reduction of 78 thousand tons of carbon
equivalent. Using the amount spent by utility on providing rebates we ﬁnd that, over the lifetime of a
clothes washer, this leads to a cost of $158 for each ton of carbon equivalent emissions forgone. The cost-
effectiveness of clothes washer rebate programs in terms of megawatt hour is $32. Utilities are, therefore,
better-off providing incentives to their customers instead of having additional power plants that are costlier
to build and operate. This ﬁgure is consistent with the cost-effectiveness of DSM initiatives that, according
to various authors, range from between $8.9 and $253.7.
An important feature of this paper is the use of utility-level rebate programs that have been aggregated
up to the state level. This allows us to capture the effect of these DSM programs on the market share
of energy-efﬁcient ENERGY STAR appliances. However, this is also a limitation of our analysis since we
would, ideally, have preferred to use utility-level sales data to capture the effect more precisely. There have
been relatively few papers that have an ex post analysis of speciﬁc DSM programs. Our aim was to take one
particular aspect of DSM and analyse its cost-effectiveness. The study of other DSM components should be
the agenda for future research. There are many supporters and a few opponents of DSM and it is important
to resolve the argument about the beneﬁts of DSM.
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A Appendix
A.1 Tables
21Table 8: AVERAGE ENERGY USE OF DISHWASHERS & REFRIGERATORS (IN KWH/YEAR)
Dishwashers Refrigerators
Year non-ENERGY STAR ENERGY STAR non-ENERGY STAR ENERGY STAR
2001 700 555 540 450
2002 700 555 558 502
2003 574 455 558 502
2004 439 336 520 442
2005 413 341 520 442
2006 448 341 525 457
Source: D&R International Ltd.
Table 9: REGRESSION MODELS WITH AVERAGE UTILITY REBATES (2001 – 2006)
Fixed Effects
Variable FE1 FE2 FE3 FE4
CW*Rebate .978 .419 .432 .249
(.138) (.091) (.091) (.066)
DW*Rebate 1.571 .260 .281 -.376
(.206) (.161) (.161) (.085)
RF*Rebate 1.049 .225 .213 .031
(.159) (.110) (.115) (.083)
DW dummy .860 .843
(.058) (.059)
RF dummy .043 .028
(.037) (.037)
Log Personal Income 3.855 4.045 .147
(.731) (.836) (.230)
Share of People with Degrees 4.340 3.988 .098
(1.192) (1.237) (.216)
Log Electricity Price .407 -.071 -.185
(.468) (.605) (.077)
Quarter dummies*Appliance dummies Yes
Year-Quarter dummies*Appliance dummies Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3599 3599 3599 3599
Groups 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 .291 .545 .573 .923
Signiﬁcance level at 1% denoted by .
Dependent variable is Log (Share of sales of ENERGY STAR Appliances).
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level.
Utility rebate amounts re-scaled, CW: Clothes Washers, RF: Refrigerators, DW: Dishwashers
22Table 10: REGRESSION MODELS WITH AVERAGE UTILITY REBATES (2001 – 2006)
Random Effects
Variable RE1 RE2 RE3 RE4
CW*Rebate .861 .656 .657 .280
(.127) (.116) (.113) (.070)
DW*Rebate 1.248 .866 .859 -.298
(.218) (.236) (.233) (.073)
RF*Rebate .848 .516 .483 .072
(.171) (.197) (.177) (.073)
DW dummy .858 .848
(.058) (.058)
RF dummy .042 .039
(.037) (.036)
Log Personal Income .047 .049 .016
(.028) (.027) (.012)
Share of People with Degrees 3.010 2.999 1.139
(.513) (.506) (.168)
Log Electricity Price .595 .550 .084
(.111) (.110) (.042)
Quarter dummies*Appliance dummies Yes
Year-Quarter dummies*Appliance dummies Yes
Obs. 3599 3599 3599 3599
Groups 50 50 50 50
R2 .267 .331 .374 .907
Signiﬁcance level at 1% denoted by .
Dependent variable is Log (Share of sales of ENERGY STAR Appliances)
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level
Utility rebate amounts re-scaled, CW: Clothes Washers, RF: Refrigerators, DW: Dishwashers
23Table 11: REGRESSION MODELS WITH AVERAGE WEIGHTED UTILITY REBATES (2001 – 2006)
Random Effects
Variable RE1 RE2 RE3 RE4
CW*Rebate 1.340 .888 .893 .336
(.218) (.132) (.137) (.127)
DW*Rebate 2.329 2.027 1.999 -.431
(.643) (.538) (.517) (.379)
RF*Rebate 1.408 .842 .681 .235
(.478) (.346) (.342) (.150)
DW dummy .824 .814
(.054) (.054)
RF dummy .006 .0004
(.035) (.035)
Log Personal Income .084 .086 .020
(.029) (.027) (.013)
Share of People with Degrees 4.012 3.984 1.108
(.515) (.494) (.166)
Log Quarterly Price .566 .517 .069
(.115) (.114) (.044)
Quarter dummies*Appliance dummies Yes
Year-Quarter dummies*Appliance dummies Yes
Obs. 3599 3599 3599 3599
Groups 50 50 50 50
R2 .240 .309 .352 .901
Signiﬁcance level at 1% denoted by .
Dependent variable is Log (Share of sales of ENERGY STAR Appliances)
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level
Utility rebate amounts re-scaled, CW: Clothes Washers, RF: Refrigerators, DW: Dishwashers
24Table 12: PEAK SPOT PRICES FOR MAJOR PRICING POINTS (IN $/MWH)
On-Peak Spot Prices Off-Peak Spot Prices
2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006
Northeast
Mass Hub 59.05 61.47 89.87 70.33 41.80 42.94 61.79 47.45
NY Zone G 61.73 61.74 92.46 76.53 42.12 42.86 63.70 50.54
NY Zone J 77.82 76.63 110.03 86.47 48.70 48.28 72.61 55.05
NY Zone A 51.36 52.49 76.04 59.34 35.78 36.82 53.26 42.20
PJM West 48.49 51.10 76.64 62.92 24.14 30.15 40.72 36.36
Southeast
VACAR 41.60 48.27 71.88 57.20 19.44 25.23 38.13 34.96
Southern 41.55 48.67 70.88 56.15 19.51 26.01 37.54 33.86
TVA 38.90 44.23 67.39 53.91 18.73 22.14 34.24 32.76
Florida 52.21 58.31 84.95 65.06 22.25 29.02 42.88 39.78
Entergy 41.47 45.76 69.95 56.65 18.39 23.04 38.02 34.06
Southeast
Cinergy 37.57 43.31 63.76 52.39 15.91 19.88 29.12 29.93
ECAR North 38.41 45.58 67.13 55.94 16.54 21.00 30.84 29.30
MAIN North 43.14 47.94 64.70 58.67 16.47 20.28 28.78 25.73
NI Hub 37.11 42.03 61.76 53.15 15.44 17.57 28.71 28.35
MAIN South 38.43 42.85 63.38 51.73 16.06 18.41 28.70 25.54
MAPP North 45.18 47.06 65.06 58.67 17.22 19.12 28.57 25.73
MAPP South 43.29 45.90 65.48 55.56 16.93 19.00 28.01 32.61
South Central
SPP North 41.66 45.19 67.44 56.23 18.48 20.55 34.82 33.91
ERCOT 46.49 47.32 70.95 58.74 30.51 31.45 47.95 39.09
Southwest
Four Corners 48.55 50.51 69.39 58.79 32.28 35.45 46.74 36.45
Palo Verde 49.10 50.09 67.39 57.85 32.84 35.44 47.10 36.91
Mead 50.65 51.91 70.18 59.79 33.75 37.43 49.02 38.44
Northwest
Mid- Columbia 40.73 44.54 62.95 49.52 34.04 39.27 50.21 37.23
COB 44.49 49.09 66.95 55.08 35.23 40.58 51.71 39.14
California
NP 15 49.13 54.46 72.49 60.81 35.76 41.35 51.35 39.17
SP 15 51.25 55.20 73.03 61.77 35.15 39.26 51.22 40.07
Source: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
25